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This paper studies how individual religiosity affects people’s behaviour. In particular here I study the behaviour of the second players 
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1.  Introduction 
Religions teach particular rules and values to theirs members. One of the most important 
precepts of Christ’s teaching is charity: the good Christian cares about the others’ situation and is 
concerned about sharing his/her resources with the poor. In the Gospel this idea is generally 
equalitarian: it is presented as an equal division of the resources among the members of a group
1 
(Wallis, 2005). I aim at checking whether religious people apply this moral rule in economic 
decisions.  
  
Religion is found to affect relevant economic decisions of the individuals. An important 
consequence of this at a macro level is that more religious countries attain higher growth (Barro and 
McClearly, 2003). At the  micro level Iannaccone (1994) stresses that affiliation to a certain 
confession rather than to another is likely to drive people towards higher saving rates and higher 
wages. Iannaccone (1995) provides also evidence of how religious beliefs are important in 
household production. Keister (2003) relates the accumulation of financial assets in early adulthood 
to religious affiliation and participation. However, so far little attention has been paid by the 
economists or religion to the possible effects of religiosity on individual pro-social attitudes.  
 
According to Holm and Danielson (2005) the decisions of the players in experimental games 
are driven also by unconditional distribution preferences: donations in a dictator game and shares 
returned in a trust game are significantly correlated. The existence of a moral norm (equal sharing 
in the case of Christians) followed by the players could be an explanation. Indeed Anderson and 
Mellor (2009) find that religiosity may sustain cooperation in a public good game. Using a trust 
game (see Berg et al., 1995) I find that more religious (namely Lutherans
2) people tend to split the 
pie equally, rather than behaving in an opportunistic or other-rewarding way. 
                                                 
1 Luke, 3:11; Acts, 4:32. See also Harrington et al. (2005). 
2 Although I did not ask of which religious denomination the responder was member, I assume that the large majority of the 
participants to the experiment were lutheran, mirroring the Norwegian population.    3
2.  Methodology 
In this paper I use a basic trust game. This involves couples of people, playing non 
simultaneously. The first member of the couple (the first to play) is endowed with some money: 
he/she has to decide how much to pass to the game mate (who has no endowment). The 
experimenter triples this amount and gives it to the second player, who must decide how much of 
the received sum he/she wishes to pass back to the first player. This decision ends the game. Both 
the players have complete information about the rules of the game, and full anonymity is ensured. 
An ultimatum or a dictator game (for designs see Camerer, 2003) could also be employed, but a 
trust game is more suitable for this type of study. In fact, the second mover may receive some 
money from the endowment of the partner, and this may stimulate some sentiments
3 to play a role, 
thus strengthening the impulse to pass back some positive sum. To look for the presence of this 
positive stimulus is useful for my inquiry: if religiosity makes the player’s choice to converge 
towards even sharing rather than to one of the other two possible outcomes (especially the generous 
one; see below), this would mean that among religious people the sense of equal splitting prevails.. 
It might also be possible that the presence of the stimulus induces the more religious people to 
prefer the intermediate outcome to the others. In other words I am hypothesizing that equal sharing 
is the way followed by religious people to “reciprocate”. Also in this case, however, if the choice of 
equal redistribution prevails on the others within religious people, this would clearly highlight an 
influence of religion on people’s decision process.  
 
 The existent literature typically measures the individual religious attitude through personal 
beliefs and/or participation to the services. I adopt a stricter measure of individual religiosity: the 
time that a person spends weekly within religious voluntary associations. Participation to these 
groups requires both a religious belief and a positive intention to devote some spare time within an 
association, among whose goals the propagation of religious values plays a central role. Hence these 
people show a strong religious attitude, which I assume to be stronger and stronger as the time 
devoted to the association increases.  
 
A total of 207 undergraduate students from the University of Oslo
4 participated in the game: 
105 were first movers and 102 were second movers
5. I classify the choices of the second movers 
into three strategies: opportunistic (keeping a payoff higher than the counterpart’s), equalitarian 
(transferring an amount of money such that both players end with the same payoff), or generous 
                                                 
3 Among them we can mention anger, reciprocity or gratefulness, as highlighted by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Molm et al. (2000), 
Camerer (2003) and Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004). 
4 All of them were from the School of Economics, but none had already taken any course in Game Theory or related topics.  
5 The difference between the number of participants in the two groups reflects the fact that some people in both groups had to be 
excluded because they violated the requirement of anonymity in filling their forms.    4
(transferring  an amount of money so that the counterpart ends with a payoff higher than the second 
mover)
6. As a consequence here I consider only those second movers who got more than ¼ of the 
initial endowment (2,300 NOK) from the first mover
7. Since the decision of the latter is tripled, 
those who receive more than ¼ of the initial endowment can choose one out of the three possible 
described outcomes. The other second movers have not access to the full set of choices and 
therefore are not taken into account
8. Indeed the considered sub-sample is such that, after the first 
stage of the game and before the second is played, the first mover has a preliminary payoff that is 
lower than the second mover’s. After playing the game, the participants filled in an anonymous 
questionnaire aimed at collecting socio-demographic data and participation to several different 
voluntary associations and social networks. At the end of the game two couples were randomly 
drawn and paid according to their choices. Notice that the high notional endowment ensures a high 
expected value
9, whose magnitude constitutes a good incentive to play seriously.  
 
Three dummy variables are constructed, one for each of the three possible outcomes; this 
allows for estimating the probability of belonging to one of the three groups by the means of a 
probit analysis. This methodology to analyze the outcomes of a trust game has also been employed 
in Migheli (2007). 
                                                 
6 A long discussion about this “generous” strategy would be possible. The existing experimental literature does not provide a 
definitive explanation for this behaviour. Apparently more than just generosity justifies it: the original designers of the game talk 
about reciprocity, others about gratefulness, social paradigms, etc. However here it is neither my intention, nor the aim of the paper, 
to discuss this point. The etiquette that I attach to this behaviour is purely motivated by practical reasons, and the semantic choice is 
aimed at driving the attention of the reader intuitively towards the outcome of the choice. I do not intend to participate, by this 
specific paper, to the discussion about the motivation(s) behind this kind of choice.  
7 A total of 88 subjects are therefore retained.  
8 This can be easily shown. Let S be the initial endowment of the first mover and α the share passed to the second mover. Since the 
experimenter triples this amount of money, the second mover’s endowment is equal to 3α. If α>¼S, then at this stage of the game the 
first movers keeps less than ¾S, whilst his/her counterpart is endowed with more than this. 
9 Equivalent to an hourly income ranging from a minimum of 184 NOK and a maximum of 552 NOK.   5
3.  Results 
The graphs depict the frequencies of the amounts passed back to the first player. It is possible 
to notice that people who are member of religious associations display a behaviour that appears to 
be more “regular” than non-members’ (Figures 4 and 5). In particular the sums passed back by the 
players who devote some spare time to religious associations are chosen so to split the pie evenly. I 
will show this in the following econometric analysis. Here it is sufficient to notice that the modal 
choice for the full sample and for the two gender-based sub-samples is represented by 3,450NOK; 
moreover, while some males who received 6,900NOK passed back the entire amount (this means 
that they did not keep any money for themselves), no female player chose it.  
 
Table 1 reports the results of the probit regressions, one for each possible outcome. As usually 
found in the literature (Camerer, 2003), the received amount affects the decision of the second 
mover positively: the larger it is, the higher the probability of not behaving opportunistically. The 
time spent within voluntary religious associations is significantly linked with all the three 
behaviours, but the association is negative for the opportunistic and the generous outcomes, whilst it 
is positive for the equalitarian. This supports the initial hypothesis: the more people are endowed 
with religious capital
10 and the more practice Christian values the more they are prone to share the 
resources equally, rather than to choose any other allocation. The analysis of the marginal effects 
suggests that the aversion to an opportunistic behaviour is more significant than to a generous 
behaviour, when the whole sample is considered (table 1); this finding no longer holds when each 
of the two non equalitarian outcomes is compared to the equalitarian only (table 2), but in this case 
the difference between the marginal effects is not significant (so the aversion against either non 
equalitarian behaviour  may be the same). Moreover we can notice that men tend more to be 
generous rather than opportunistic or equalitarian with respect to women, while working students 
are rather opportunistic instead of generous or equalitarian, perhaps because they have a utility 
function of money shifted upwards.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of probit regressions when only a couple of outcomes (i.e. either 
generous and equalitarian or opportunistic and equalitarian) are analyzed. The previous conclusion 
gets confirmed.  
                                                 
10 For the strong connection between religion and social capital see Smidt (2003).    6
4.  Conclusions 
This paper shows that, when allocating resources, the participants to the experiment who 
spend more time in voluntary religious associations are more prone than the average of the 
population to opt for an even distribution rather than for an opportunistic or a generous one.  
 
People who spend time in voluntary religious organizations put in practice and very likely 
teach the fundamental rules of their religion (in Norway, namely Lutheran Christianity). Among 
these the even sharing of resources plays a crucial role, and this paper shows that the more a person 
participates in a religious based network, the more probably he/she will apply this social norm. This 
result is relevant as also when they are required to allocate resources outside the environment of the 
association, or, in any case, outside a religious environment they may exhibit the same allocation 
preference. As a conclusion I would highlight that Christian values can affect the behaviour of 
people charged of managing resources of programmes with (above all) humanitarian or social aims.    7
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Figure 1. Amounts passed back to the first player (whole sample)
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Figure 3. Amounts passed back to the first player (female players)
Figure 4. Amounts passed back to the first player (subsample of those participants
who are not members of religious associations)
Figure 5. Amounts passed back to the first player (subsample of those participants
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Table 1. Probit regressions for the three different outcomes
Dependent variable:
Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect




Male 0.462 0.164 -0.753 -0.283 0.873 0.150
(0.366) (0.136) (0.426)* (0.149)* (0.406)** (0.078)**
Time spent within:
     religious associations -0.385 -0.134 0.595 0.233 -0.460 -0.068
(0.209)* (0.071)* (0.194)*** (0.076)*** (0.216)** (0.032)**
     sports associations -0.043 -0.015 0.014 0.006 0.039 0.006
(0.068) (0.024) (0.046) (0.018) (0.047) (0.008)
     cultural associations 0.124 0.043 -0.203 -0.079 0.158 0.023
(0.088) (0.029) (0.044)** (0.037)** (0.084)* (0.014)*
     political associations -0.222 -0.077 0.153 0.060 -0.084 -0.012
(0.137)* (0.045)* (0.115) (0.046) (0.077) (0.012)
Time spent in communications through
     telephone 0.010 0.004 -0.138 -0.054 0.223 0.033
(0.117) (0.041) (0.100) (0.039) (0.111)** (0.018)**
     text messages 0.005 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.0004
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0005)
     the Internet -0.038 -0.013 0.123 0.048 -0.185 -0.027
(0.041) (0.014) (0.037)*** (0.014)*** (0.064)*** (0.001)***
Having a job 1.025 0.311 0.243 0.094 -1.587 -0.344
(0.414)** (0.100)*** (0.353) (0.135) (0.391)*** (0.103)***
Ethnicity
1 0.071 0.025 -0.264 -0.103 0.355 0.052
(0.205) (0.071) (0.201) (0.079) (0.263) (0.040)
Constant 0.896 -2.160 -0.629
(0.716) (0.750)*** (1.014)
Pr(y = 1) 0.301 0.423 0.079
1 Ethnicity takes values 0, 1, 2, 3 according to the answer of the player to the following question: “Do you feel: 0) from my own region; 1) Norwegian; 2) European; 3) nationality is not important at all. 
Number of observations: 85 85 85
Pseudo-R
2 0.374 0.361 0.302




   11
Table 2. Probit regression for adopting a generous or an opportunistic behaviour vs. an equalitarian behaviour
Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect





Male 0.805 0.243 1.773 0.431
(0.469)* (0.113)** (0.646)*** (0.159)***
Time spent within:
     religious associations -0.421 -0.159 -0.953 -0.230
(0.169)*** (0.064)*** (0.312)*** (0.081)***
     sports associations -0.032 -0.012 0.040 0.008
(0.067) (0.025) (0.057) (0.012)
     cultural associations 0.190 0.072 0.306 0.065
(0.087)** (0.034)** (0.191) (0.043)
     political associations -0.296 -0.112 -0.146 -0.031
(0.139)** (0.053)** (0.135) (0.028)
Time spent in communications through
     telephone 0.080 0.030 0.290 0.062
(0.114) (0.044) (0.198) (0.042)
     text messages 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001
(0.003)* (0.001)* (0.010) (0.002)
     the Internet -0.072 -0.027 -0.288 -0.061
(0.039)* (0.015)* (0.100)*** (0.022)***
Having a job 0.386 0.152 -1.661 -0.391
(0.486) (0.188) (0.491)*** (0.125)***
Ethnicity
1 0.268 0.101 0.407 0.087
(0.236) (0.086) (0.364) (0.081)
Constant 1.151 0.567
(0.783) (1.246)
Pr(y = 1) 0.409 0.123
Number of observations: 73 52
Pseudo-R
2 0.438 0.434
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APPENDIX I: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
There are two groups of students: A and B (both from the University of...). Each Student A is anonymously 
and randomly matched to another Student B.  
Step 1 
Student A receives the notional sum of 200€ and decides how to share this amount between himself and 
Student B. 
Step 2 
The amount Student A passed to Student B is tripled; in other words, for each euro that Student A 
passes, Student B receives 3€. Student B knows that the received sum is determined in this way. 
Step 3 
Student B decides how to share the received sum between himself and Student A. 
Step 4 
A couple of students will be randomly drawn and paid according to their decisions. These two students 
will be separately paid to avoid them to meet.  
Warning: 
•  All the decisions remain totally anonymous. 
•  These instructions are perfectly identical for all the components of both groups A and B. 
 
You are a student of group…  (exactly as all the other students in this classroom). 
•  Please, write in part A of the attached form how much you want to pass to Student B. 
•  Then answer the attached questionnaire. 
•  Take the numbered paper. If your number is drawn, you have to show it in order to be paid. 
•  Handle back the form and the questionnaire. 
 
The drawn number will be announced during one of the following classes and published on the website. 
 






You divide 200€ between yourself and a Student B. Write down the 










You receive three times the amount Student A  




You divide this amount between yourself and Student A. 
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APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1.  Below there is a list of different voluntary associations. Indicate how much time on average 
(hours and minutes) you spend weekly in each of them. Indicate also the number of associations 
of the same type you are a member. Moreover explicitly indicate whether you are not a member 
of some of the listed types. 
 
Associations  Time  Number  Not a 
member 
Sports associations (including gyms)        h      min.    ⁫ 
Religious associations        h      min    ⁫ 
Cultural associations (music, theatre, arts, ...)        h      min    ⁫ 
Own Faculty students’ associations (i.e..)        h      min    ⁫ 
Other students’ associations        h      min    ⁫ 
       Specify 
Environmental associations (WWF, Greenpeace, 
...) 
      h      min    ⁫ 
Associations for animals’ rights (es.)        h      min     
Political parties/associations        h      min    ⁫ 
Youth clubs (Scouts, ...)        h      min    ⁫ 
Social aimed associations (i.e. Red Cross, …)      
Other associations         h      min    ⁫ 
       Specify 
    
2.  How much time on average do you spend weekly in phone talks with friends  (including 
Skype)? ______ h    ______ min  
 
3.  How many short text messages do you send from your mobile on average per week? _      _____ 
 
4.  How much time (hours and minutes) on average do you spend weekly in active Internet 
communications (reading and writing emails, chatting,  ...)?  
_ ____ h    ______ min  
 
5.  How much free time on average do you spend weekly with your friends?  
______ h    ______ min  
   15
6.  How many brothers do you have?    ___    __    
How many sisters do you have?         _    __    
 
7.  Have you a student job currently?  ⁫ Yes ⁫ No     
 
8.  Do you live in the city of the university?   (domicile)  ⁫ Yes  ⁫ No 
If no, during the week do you live … (in a student room/apartment)?  ⁫ Yes ⁫ No 
 
9.  Which country and province are you from? 
Country: _  _________________________ Region:_________________________   
 
10. Are you the owner of the apartment you live in? ⁫ Yes   ⁫ No 
If no, please indicate how many crowns per month you pay for the rent of your room/apartment 
_____________ 
 
11. To which of the following group do you feel to belong firstly                                              ⁫ own 
region       ⁫ Norwegian    ⁫ Scandinavian       ⁫ European          
⁫ Other (specify):_______         
                                                                                    
12. Gender:         ⁫ M   ⁫ F 
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